Abstract-It is often necessary to disclose training data to the public domain, while protecting privacy of certain sensitive labels. We use information theoretic measures to develop such privacy preserving data disclosure mechanisms. Our mechanism involves perturbing the data vectors to strike a balance in the privacy-utility trade-off. We use maximal information leakage between the output data vector and the confidential label as our privacy metric. We first study the theoretical Bernoulli-Gaussian model and study the privacy-utility trade-off when only the mean of the Gaussian distributions can be perturbed. We show that the optimal solution is the same as the case when the utility is measured using probability of error at the adversary. We then consider an application of this framework to a data driven setting and provide an empirical approximation to the Sibson mutual information. By performing experiments on the MNIST and FERG data sets, we show that our proposed framework achieves equivalent or better privacy than previous methods based on mutual information.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental questions of interest in data closure is how much information is leaked regarding a quantity when an observation is made about a correlated quantity. If the observation is made by a malignant adversary, then it is imperative to protect the sensitive quantity, and minimize the amount of information leaked. The focus of this paper is to address the problem of applying transformations to sensitive data for disclosure under privacy constraints with an informationtheoretic framework.
Related work in context-dependent privacy adopt classical information-theoretic measures such as mutual information to quantify the amount of information leaked between the observed variable and the private variable [1] [2] . As opposed to context-independent privacy notions such as differential privacy, these approaches account for the statistical distribution of the data and make reasonable assumptions on the properties of an adversary, resulting in better utility. In both works, the authors use a min-max formulation of a generative adversarial network (GAN) to learn various privatization schemes parameterized by neural networks that achieve a trade-off between distortion and privacy. Similarly, in [3] , the authors consider two different possible losses for a similar adversarial model, a binary 0 − 1 loss and the empirical log-loss, and minimizing them are equivalent to assuming an MAP adversary and a minimum cross-entropy adversary.
We propose using maximal information leakage [4] as a privacy measure for data disclosure applications. We first consider a Bernoulli-Gaussian data model and a privatizer that is allowed to make affine transformations to minimize the information leakage under a distortion constraint. We then demonstrate that the optimal solution is identical to that when minimizing the error probability of the adversary, and with a numerical approximation, it is also identical to minimizing the Sibson mutual information. We also study the performance of this metric using empirical approximations by formulating a loss function for an adversarial model to capture the tradeoff between the information leakage and the reconstruction error. For synthetic and real data-sets, this metric was shown to provide better privacy given a reconstruction error.
Maximal information leakage is motivated by a guessing adversary to characterize the amount of information the public variable Z leaks about a confidential variable C. Leakage is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of an adversary's probability of a correct guess of a (randomized) function of C denoted asÛ (C) when Z is observed, to the probability of a correct blind guess. The maximal information leakage then is defined as the maximum leakage over all possible functions. Since it is maximized over the random variable U with the Markov chain U − C − Z, it represents the worst case of possible functions of U . In [4] the maximization is proven to admit a closed-form solution and is proven to be equal to the Sibson mutual information of order infinity. Sibson mutual information is a generalization of mutual information, defined in equation (1) for discrete random variables X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y distributed as P (X, Y ):
This definition of Sibson mutual information in the limit as α → ∞ is shown to be equal to the maximal information leakage [5] L(X → Y ) = sup
= log
In [6] we provide a motivating example for why maximal information leakage is an appropriate measure of privacy against an adversary.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS
We study the utility of using maximal information leakage as a privacy measure in this paper as opposed to previous work based on mutual information optimization [3] [2] . We demonstrate that three metrics ((1) the MAP adversary accuracy (2) Maximal information leakage and (3) an approximation of Sibson mutual information) all result in the same optimization problem in a Bernoulli-Gaussian data model with affine transformations. An extension of the transformation with noise is considered in [6] .
In section IV we adapt our setup to be used in models where we have access to data samples drawn from the distribution instead of the parameters of the distribution. Section V demonstrates results from synthetic Gaussian data where we can compare with theoretical MAP adversary accuracies, the MNIST data-set, and FERG data-set, and we conclude in section VI.
We propose to use a GAN-like setup where we simultaneously train two models: (1) an adversarial classification model which has access to the training set along with private labels and (2) an auto-encoder to implement a randomized privatizer that is subjected to a distortion constraint and a privacy constraint using Sibson mutual information. By training both the models in tandem we show that significant improvements can be attained in the privacy-utility trade-off. For the FERG data-set, we design a variant of the auto-encoding model to measure the utility based on the adversary's ability to infer a related public variable rather than just the reconstruction.
III. AFFINE TRANSFORMATIONS OF GAUSSIAN DATA

A. Gaussian data definitions
We consider a theoretical setting where the privatizer controlling the transform has access to the joint distributions of the public variable X and the private variable C as P (X, C), and the adversary aims to infer C based on knowledge of Z, which is a transform of X, C. X follows a mixture of Gaussian distribution:
with conditional probabilities
W.L.O.G. we may let µ 0 ≤ µ 1 . The Gaussian distributions have equal covariance for tractability purposes.
B. Affine transformation
We define the following data-dependent affine transformation:
This transformation is dependent on the parameters β 0 , β 1 , and can be seen in Figure 1 .
The Z distribution conditioned on the class C are defined by its means µ 0 , µ 1 and variance σ 2 . The adversary knows the distribution of Z and therefore only needs to compute its guess via the MAP decision rule given Z. 
C. Optimization problem and solutions
With the affine transformation, we define an additional distortion constraint based on a distortion budget denoted as D as a measure of utility:
Under the aforementioned transformations we consider the following optimization problem:
The solution to this optimization problem is
and
otherwise. Refer to [6] for detailed solutions.
We will now consider MAP adversary accuracy, maximal information leakage, and Sibson mutual information as privacy metrics when optimizing over the transformation in section III-B, and show that these optimization problems are related to equation (12) whose solution gives the parameters of the optimal transformation.
D. MAP accuracy as a metric
We consider the optimization for the transformations in section III-B with the MAP adversary's accuracy as the privacy metric, as prior work [3] has done. The optimization problem is
where P r(Ĉ = C) is the MAP adversary's accuracy. We can characterize the adversary's accuracy in terms of the distortion constraint and the optimal transformation with the following theorem:
Theorem III.1. Under the binary Gaussian data scenario based on equations and inequalities (4) -(10) over the set D, the adversary's accuracy after solving the optimization for the optimal parameters (β *
where the Q(·) function is
and the solutions β * 0 , β * 1 are given by equations (13), (15). Proof: Refer to [6] for the full proof.
In [3] , their game theoretic solutions are the same as ours for optimization over the MAP adversary accuracy in equation (13), but we specify a constraint on the distortion budget D (equation (14)) that gives another solution (equation (15)) when the condition is not satisfied.
E. Maximal Information Leakage as a metric
With maximal information leakage as the metric, the optimization solution is now given by:
The following theorem relates the optimization problem to the optimization in equation (12), and characterizes the solutions of the optimization.
Theorem III.2. Under binary mixture of Gaussians data described in equations (4) -(10) over the set D, assuming µ 0 < µ 1 , the solution to minimization of maximal information leakage is equal to
and the solutions β * 0 , β * 1 are given by equations (13, 15). Proof: Refer to [6] for the full proof.
Therefore when optimizing the maximal information leakage for the defined data distribution and transformation, it is equivalent to minimizing an adversary's theoretical performance, and both reduce to minimizing the normalized distance between the means of the transformed Gaussian distributions.
F. Sibson mutual information as a metric
Here we consider Sibson mutual information as the privacy metric in the same optimization. Since the maximal information leakage is equal to the Sibson mutual information of order ∞ [4], we will approximate it with Sibson mutual information of order α. The optimization is now:
The following theorem relates the optimization of Sibson mutual information to the optimization in equation (12) and characterizes the solutions.
Theorem III.3. Under binary mixture of Gaussians data described by equations (4) -(10) over the set D, the solution to the minimization of Sibson mutual information is equal to
and the approximate solutions β * 0 , β * 1 are given by equations (13, 15).
Proof: Refer to [6] for the full proof. 
= arg min
IV. DATA DRIVEN APPROACH FOR MAXIMAL
INFORMATION LEAKAGE
A. Model overview
Given a data set consisting of N pairs of (X, C) drawn from some
, the problem is to find some (randomized) mapping (X, C) → Z such that the privatized representation Z leaks as little information as possible with regards to the private variable C. X is continuous, and the private variable C is a discrete variable correlated with X with G different possible values, often the class which X belongs to. In order to learn the mapping, we use neural networks to parameterize the adversary g and privatizer f in an auto-encoding model. The adversary is assumed to be trained, so that its posterior estimates P (Ĉ|Z) are close to the true posterior, allowing us to make an approximation in the calculation of empirical Sibson mutual information.
The adversary is trained to make inferences on the private variable, and the privatizer is trained to minimize the privacy metric and adhere to a distortion budget. For neural network encoders, the encoder f (x, c) = (f µ (x, c), f Σ (x, c)) takes data pairs (x, c) as input, and outputs the parameters of the conditional Z distribution P (Z|X, C). We've chosen the conditional Z to be Gaussian because it is a flexible distribution and allows for sampling with the method in [7] . S samples of Z are generated as inputs to the adversary using the reparameterization trick from [7] . The privatizer also reconstructsX from the samples of Z to let us compute the reconstruction error component in its loss function. The adversary g(z) outputs predictions for C in the vector P (Ĉ|Z) given the average over the S samples of Z.
For neural network encoders in experiments, we measure distortion as the average reconstruction error by default
For synthetic data, we also conduct experiments with affine encoders, but the adversary is still represented by a neural network. When using affine transformations in the encoder, we measure the distortion as
where the parameters of the encoder are β 0 , β 1 and the transform is from equation (6) . Both the adversary f and the privatizer g are neural networks each parameterized by θ p and θ a . The optimal parameters for θ p , θ a are found through an iterative alternating training algorithm to keep the adversary optimal for each iteration of optimization for the privatizer over the empirical approximation of the Sibson mutual information, which are further discussed.
B. Empirical loss
In this section we approximate the Sibson mutual information. It requires knowledge of the posterior distribution P (C|Z) which is not easily accessible, but due to the presence of a trained adversary, we have access to the MAP adversary's posterior estimate ofĈ after the observation of Z. Along with a predetermined prior probability of C, we may approximate the Sibson mutual information as follows.
Refer to [6] for detailed derivations. In comparison, with mutual information, we have:
We use our estimate of the mutual information as a comparative metric denoted as "MI" in experiments with MNIST and FERG data. The Sibson mutual information estimate allows us to design an adversarial model to minimize it as an objective function when learning the privacy mapping. prediction ofĈ. The empirical estimate of the Sibson mutual information is derived from equation (31) for a mini-batch of size M .
For synthetic data, the distortion measure is the distortion budget
for an affine privatizer. For synthetic data using a neural network privatizer and for real-world data, we use the L2 distance specified in equation (27) , and the penalty coefficient ρ t increases with the number of iterations t. The training procedure is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Alternate training for privacy-preserving adversarial model
Input: M, S, N, k, D, {c i }, {x i } Output: θ T p , θ T a θ 0 p ← N (0, I), θ 0 a ← N (0, I), t = 0 while t ≤ T do ρ t = 10t T + 1 θ t,0 a ← θ t a for (j = 0; j < k; j + +) do θ t,j+1 a ← f Adam (∇ θa L a (θ t p , θ t,j a , ρ t )) {fAdam is the output from one update of the Adam optimizer on the adversary's loss component} end for θ t+1 a ←θ t,k−1 a θ t+1 p ← g Adam (∇ θp L p (θ t p , θ t+1 a , ρ t )) {gAdam is the output from one update of the Adam optimizer on the privatizer's loss component} t ← t + 1 end while return θ T p , θ T a
V. EXPERIMENTS
The following section demonstrates the use of Sibson mutual information as the privacy metric in an adversarial model with synthetic and real-world data and our experimental results.
A. Synthetic data
Synthetic data is generated by drawing from a Bernoulli prior distribution withp = 1 −p = 0.5 for the class of each data point C, the X variable is conditionally drawn from a Gaussian distribution with parameters N (3, 1) and N (−3, 1) for 15000 points. Of those points, 10000 are used for training, and 5000 are used for validation. For the synthetic data, we consider the encoder as affine (section III-F), affine with noise (see [6] ), or a fully connected neural network with 2 fully connected layers which map a 1 dimensional X into the two parameters of the 1 dimensional Z which is distributed as a Gaussian. We average over a sample of 12 points from the Z distribution and feed to the decoder, a fully connected neural network with 2 fully connected layers in the reconstruction and inference branch respectively. The outputs of the decoder areX and P (C|Z), where the adversary aims to minimize the cross-entropy loss, the encoder aims to minimize the privacy metric, subject to a reconstruction constraint. We compare this with the mutual information metric using the same model, but the empirical mutual information from equation (34) instead of (31) for the privatizer loss in equation (36). The adversary's accuracy for both metrics are plotted in Fig 3 labeled as  "(NN) ". For optimization, we use the Adam optimizer [8] on our algorithm with a learning rate of 10 −3 and a mini-batch size of M = 500 over 1000 epochs.
The values of the distortion and adversary accuracy can be seen in Table I . 
B. MNIST data
The MNIST data consists of 60000 gray-scale images of pen-written digits and their corresponding digit label. 50000 data points are used for training, and 10000 are used for validation. For the MNIST data, we implemented a 3-layer convolutional neural network for the encoder, a 4-layer deconvolutional network for the decoder's reconstruction branch, and a fully connected network with two fully connected layers of hidden units with ReLU activation for the decoder's inference branch. The privatized representation Z is a 128 dimensional isotropic Gaussian whose parameters (µ z , Σ z ) are generated by the encoder. The inference metric for the adversary is cross-entropy as in equation (35) and the privacy metrics are Sibson mutual information (31) and mutual information (34) as comparison. For training details, refer to our previous work [6] .
As the distortion budget is increased, we can achieve various points along the privacy-utility trade-off curve, seen in Fig 4. From the adversary accuracy plots we see that Sibson mutual information consistently outperforms mutual information at almost all distortion levels. We also conduct further experiments to show that as the order of the Sibson mutual information increases, we obtain better privacy and lower adversary accuracies. Visualizations of the reconstructed digits can be seen in our previous work [6] . 
C. FERG data
The FERG data set consists of 55767 annotated 256 × 256 RGB face images, and for storage and speed purposes, they are pre-processed to be 50 × 50 gray-scale images of varying facial expressions with identity and expression labels. 10000 images are held out for validation. Our model therefore has two branches in the decoder, one for inference of the regular variable Y (expression) and another for private C(identity). The utility in the distortion budget term is the cross-entropy of Y , and subject to this budget, the privatizer minimizes the Sibson MI over θ p . The decoder's inference branch for C acts as the adversary minimizing its cross-entropy over θ a . Refer to [6] for implementation details.
The training is done according to algorithm 1. Experiments for both Sibson MI and MI were conducted for distortion budgets ranging from 0.2 to 1.8. The accuracy for regular and private tasks are plotted for both metrics over the experimental distortion budget calculated from the validation set in Fig 5. When using mutual information as the comparison metric, we find that the adversary performs on par in the public task but better in the private task across multiple distortion budgets, indicating worse privatization. As the order of Sibson mutual information increases, the adversary accuracy also decreases across almost all distortion levels. We also consider a reconstruction task variant in [6] .
VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
For a Bernoulli-Gaussian model and affine transformations, we show that using maximal information leakage and Sibson mutual information as an optimization objective results in the same optimization problem as that of optimizing the MAP adversary accuracy, thus the optimal privatization mechanisms are equivalent. We conduct experiments on synthetic, MNIST and FERG data to demonstrate that Sibson mutual information is a viable numerical proxy to maximal information leakage and leads to better privacy in data-driven models. Future work may involve using the privatizer as part of a generator in a classic GAN framework to encourage more natural images rather than measuring reconstruction error as utility. We hope that this work will lead to wider usage of maximal information leakage in data disclosure systems and lead to stronger anonymization of user data.
